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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to scrutinize Enyimba’s theory of Madukakism as a philosophy of being 
human within the African framework and to show its implication to African environmental ethics. Enyimba’s 
theory Madukakism as a philosophy of being human is founded on the notion of Madukaku. Drawn from the Igbo 
ontological worldview, Madukaku avers that “man is supreme”, as such, possess strong anthropocentric 
implication on African worldview. Enyimba Maduka’s position seems logical as it draws its inspiration from the 
place of humans in the ecosystem and African ontology. This paper argues that although human occupies a central 
position to preserve, care and tend nature for the unity and balance of the ontology and ecosystem, it is perceived 
as anthropoholism. It is anthro-poholism because, despite man’s central role (Anthropo), man is just a part of the 
(whole) environment, as such cannot exist outside the environment, and cannot be understood without allusion to 
the environment (Holism).  This research is carried out with the philosophical method of analysis.  
Keywords: Madukaku, Madukakism, anthropocentric, communitarian, anthropoholism. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the recent devastating report released by the UN’s IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) on the recent height of global warming in the year 2018, there is now an urgent call for action 
[1]. The report warned that humanity has only twelve (12) years to act “if tipping points are to be 
avoided, beyond which uncontrollable feedback loops would (be) set in motion” [2]. Africa is known to 
be the hottest continent on earth; deserts and dry lands comprise 60% of the entire land mass [3]. While 
many of its natives struggle with poverty and countries under-development, the effect of global warming 
is more devastating on the continent natives. Many Africans cannot even afford good shelter, cars, attend 
classes or work in air-conditioned facility, at least, to reduce the effect of excessive sun caused by 
climate change. This is unlike, Europe and America which have more favorable climate and their natives 
have better access to basic amenities that help reduce the effect of extreme weather conditions. Thus 
among many others, any natural disaster resulting from global warming will be so devastating on the 
African continent and its inhabitants.  
There is no better time to articulate authentic environmental ethics in reducing this impending 
danger mostly within the African environment.  Many African scholars are now challenged to look 
inward for ethical theories, having been unsatisfied with the western ethical postulations which have 
often been labeled, anthropocentric in nature. Anthropocentricism sees man at the center of the universe.  
However, there are two versions of anthropocentrism, which are the weak and the strong. Weak 
anthropocentricism, acknowledges man at the center of the universe, but puts other beings in the 
environment into consideration.  
What makes us human is the fact that we see things through our lens and our mentality about the 
world is shaped and limited by our centered perspective and way of being within it. This kind of 
anthropocentrism appears to be unavoidable and inescapable because human perspective will always 
play in and it is also evidence in Descartes and Husserl futile attempt to remove all form of human biases 
in attaining objective knowledge. One major challenge of weak anthropocentrism is avoiding elevation 
towards egoistic and dominating tendencies of strong anthropocentrism. Strong anthropocentrism is the 
postulation that man is at the center of the universe and everything is made for him; hence man is 
supreme [4]. It is important to note that strong anthropocentric thinking is the same underlying rationale 
behind man’s greed and overexploitation of the environment which in turn has caused environmental 
degradation. Strong anthropocentrism carries supremacy mentality over other beings within the 
environment.  
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Strong Anthropocentric thinking is evident in western philosophical postulations from Protagoras 
‘man is the measure of all things’ to the Aristotelian position of ‘Man is a rational animal’, thereby 
denying other non-human animal rationality within the environment. However, Naess and Haukeland 
now identifies a change in mindset among western scholars when they aver that “today, a leading 
responsibility of humankind is the responsibility for future generations that we hand down a planet with 
resources as great as we found in our own generations. But we also have a responsibility for future living 
creatures in general” [5].  This statement can be said to be weak anthropocentric connotation, as long as 
it tries to act responsibly towards other creatures also. 
On the other hand, African ethics has been said to be communitarian in nature. This could be 
explained using Mbiti’s communitarian statement ‘“I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I 
am” [6]. When this statement is related to environmental ethics, it depicts the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of being whose existence is hinged on one another. Furthermore, it shows parties in the 
environment, with no being been self-sufficient. This is reason Tangwa aver that in traditional African 
metaphysical worldview, “the dichotomy involving “plants, animals, and inanimate things; between the 
sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the communal and the individual, is a slim and flexible one” 
[7].  However, the philosophy of Madukaku claims that against this communitarian background, humans 
are supreme in African worldview, using “man is the measure of all things” as an anchor point. If this 
postulation is true, it therefore reveals strong anthropocentric undertone within African environmental 
ethics. The thrust of this paper is to critically look at Enyimba madukaku’s strong anthropocentric 
postulation and its implication to African environmental ethics. 
 
MADUKAKU PHİLOSOPHY 
According to Enyimba Maduka, the concept of Madukaku is a combination of three Igbo words, 
which are:  Madu, aku and Ka. Its English interpretation is; “human”, “wealth” and “greater than”. The 
interpretation of this phrase means “human is greater than wealth”, however, from this phrase Enyimba’s 
Madukakism takes it to mean: the human is supreme [8]. His justification is that for African people; 
importance, worth, value, essence and high quality are attached or attributed to a human person over 
and above other things’ [8]. It is important to note that there is a vast difference between “greater than” 
which was used in transliteration of ‘ka’ and “supreme” which he later used to translate the same 
concept. However, “greater than” means higher in quality, “supreme” is often used to 
mean “dominant”, having power over all others. To this, there is a need for clarification on why the 
word “supreme” is used in place of “greater than” within the philosophical postulation. 
Enyimba Maduka further avers that wealth “refer(s) to anything else outside the human person. In 
Fact, non-human entities or objects constitute what can be called wealth” [8]. Against this background, 
it is interesting to note that humans can also be referred to as “wealth” within the same Igbo framework. 
For example names such as, Akuabata, implies that “wealth” has come in. Akunna which means 
‘Father’s wealth’ shows that the human is “wealth” [9].  To this, Enyimba Maduka’s postulation which 
states that “Wealth here can refer to anything else outside the human person” [8] is faulty, as some 
names have shown otherwise. If this is also true, then how can humans be supreme above wealth of 
which he is a part of? Since it makes no sense for humans to be ‘supreme’ over himself, the only rational 
explanation could be that “human stands out (greater than) among members in the category of “wealth”. 
This looks more logical and could translate to weak anthropocentrism as long as it does not translate to 
dominating tendencies of strong anthropocentricism on the environment. 
Enyimba Maduka’s position which identifies “Wealth” from material acquisitions and titles such 
as; money or finances, houses, cars, social, political, religious and economic status etcetera” [8] seems 
logical. This definition makes more sense to this research if it means that, Man is ‘greater than riches 
and titles’ and not necessarily generalizing every being as wealth, because riches and titles are artificial, 
in human construct. This corresponds with the Igbo proverb which states that: onye nwere mmadu ka 
onye nwere ego (he who has human beings is greater than he who has money) or nwa ka ego (child is 
greater than money). “Ego” in this sense means  “money”, it is also understood to mean wealth “uba”. 
However, since without nwa (child), one cannot get mmadu (person), the substance given to nwa is 
extended to mmadu in Igbo anthropological thought. Also, when faced with the choice between nwa 
(child) and ego (money), a traditional Igbo person will decide, first for nwa (child). This is because it is 
better valued as “nwa bu uba” (child is wealth).  
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The explanation given above could easily represent as moral learning towards tolerance and mutual 
respect of the human person. This could be seen to correspond to Enyimba Maduka’s second definition 
of wealth from material acquisitions. This also leaves the position of “human is supreme” of the theory 
of Enyimba madukakism to mean over “Ego”, which is ‘riches’, which also implies “wealth”.  To 
summarize the philosophy of Madukakism, Enyimba Maduka avers that: 
Indeed, if the human person is at the centre of the universe and its 
activities, then a person’s importance, worth and place in the 
scheme of things in the universe cannot be undermined. Thus, for 
Madukakism the human is supreme. Infact, as the centre piece of 
the pressures and influences of other beings in the cosmos, the 
human person is a force to reckon with, which goes to say that, 
“the society, community or universe is, because the human person 
is”. Thus, the protagorean dictum that “man is the measure of all 
things”… becomes significant here. This idea projects the 
philosophy and theory of Madukakism. On the contrary John S. 
Mbiti’s dictum that, “I am because we are and because we are I 
am” is antithetical to the idea of Madukaku as the basis of being 
human in Africa and as such against the foundation of the 
philosophy of Madukakism [9]. 
From the above statement, it is important to note that Madukakism is strongly against the communal 
postulations of many African philosophers before him to reveal a strong case for “individualism and 
“strong anthropocentricism” within African interactions and cultural experiences. Nevertheless, since 
its position alludes to the place of man in the cosmos within African framework, this will necessarily 
have a serious implication for African communalism as well as environmental ethics which many 
African environmentalists believe is communal in nature. Also, it should be noted that there have been 
a lot of problems identified the anchor point of the theory of Madukakism which states that “man is the 
measure of all things”. This argument has been largely flawed, by Plato and the author, in an earlier 
criticism of Enyimba Maduka postulation [10]. 
  
AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Africans’ way of life is said to be communitarian. The underlining key presumption of this is that 
African social orders put precedence on the welfare of the community over that of the individual [11]. 
This is also supported by Mbiti’s statement ‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am” [6]. 
This means that the “I” within the African framework is not as important as the “we” (the collective 
whole).  Although Mbiti’s statement is mostly used in explaining human social relations, many African 
scholars also believe that this is applicable to the environment. However, there have been lots of sharp 
disagreements on the position of the “I” in African communalism, with most scholars adhering to 
slightly different views. The debate started with Menkiti and Gyekye, while the former denied that 
individual has specific rights as it is subsumed in the ‘collective whole’, the latter thinks individual 
rights still exist despite this inherent communal spirit [12]. Despite this disagreement, both Menkiti and 
Gyekye share the same view that an African is a communal being. Ike Odimegwu also proposed 
Integrative Personhood, while taking a soft position on the “I” (13).  Enyimba Maduka proposed 
Madukakukism, taking a more radical position, abandoning the communal spirit. Although the “I” has 
always been a point of debate in African communalism, however, taking an absolute leap outside 
African communalism calls for serious questioning. 
Many African scholars take the values inherent in African communalism to explain African 
environmental ethics. For instance, Tangwa describes it as eco-bio- communitarianism against the 
western perspective he called anthropocentric, Segun Ogungbemi called it “ethics of nature relatedness” 
[14], while Mogobe B. Ramose called it ecology Ubuntu et cetera. All they tried to do is to articulate 
African communal value in environmental preservation. Tangwa, sees a strong connection between 
African environmental ethics and ontology which fosters unity and interdependence. Mbiti in explaining 
African ontology claims that God, spirits, humanity, and non-humans exist in unity, and to break that 
unity is to destroy one or more of the modes of existence, and to destroy one of them is to destroy them 
all [15]. This explains why Africans are more careful on how they relate to non-human beings, as every 
being within the environment draws its source from God, who is at the apex of African ontology. 
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However, the entire beings are accountable to God who is at the apex. This explains why taboos and 
totem play a prominent role in environmental conservation within African societies. In this way, African 
believes that these taboo and totems are divinely given to control the affairs of men in the environment, 
to break any of them poses serious implication. To this, man both “I” (‘individual’, and ‘collective 
whole’) cannot tamper with these divine laws without dare consequence. This limits the influence and 
the power of man over the environment and rejects the idea of man’s supremacy as enshrined in the 
philosophy of madukakism. This further explains why an African will pour libation before undertaking 
a specific task on nature.  For instance, an African pours libation before harvesting herbs from specific 
trees or hews down a specific tree.  
Libation is a drink offering to acknowledge the Creator, sacred ancestors, the lesser divinities, 
human beings as well as the environment. The eventual intention of libation is to uphold the cosmic 
order of equilibrium and oneness of the beings in the universe. When Africans carry out dealings 
involving nonhuman beings in the environment which also involves libation, they understand that while 
beings are not God in themselves, they are theologically linked to God and spirit can sometimes inhabit 
them.  Such thinking made western philosophers like Hegel and Levy-Bruhl see Africans as pre-logical. 
This is because as Kenyan philosopher John Mbiti posits ‘African people are notoriously religious (and) 
religion permeates all the departments of life so it is not easy or possible to isolate it” (15).  The 
accusation is that Africans often connect everything to the metaphysical realm which does not conform 
to western two-valued logic (True or false). For example,  
A tree is a tree and nothing but a tree (X is X) is the principle of identity of the Aristotelian law of 
thought.  This means either p or ∼p must be true; there is no third true the value between them. 
To this, an African thinks that a tree can also inhabit spirits, which accommodates a third truth 
value, but cannot accommodate western two-valued logic of True or False, as a spirited tree is neither 
still a tree (T) or not a tree (F). This is the reason why Chris Ijiomah proposed Harmonious Monism [16] 
and Jonathan Chimakonam proposed Ezumezu logic [17] which gives a third truth value for African 
logic. This three-valued logic can also be used to  explain Aristotle's’ future contingency statement like: 
“if a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow”. Also, it is imperative to note that an action consequential 
from two-valued orientations sometimes disreputably fails to achieve its objectives. For instance, when 
we conclude that Mr. A is said to be a criminal, without giving any benefit of doubt or accepting that he 
could act otherwise. To this, two-valued orientation harshly diminishes the capacity to assess the world 
correctly. 
British anthropologist Mary Douglas’ in her analysis of the concept of pollution and taboo between 
the “primitive” and “modern” culture discovered something unique. For her, in modern cultures, the 
implications of pollution are likely to be social sanctions, gossip, contempt, isolation, perhaps even 
police action. Nonetheless, in the “primitive” societies, the implication of pollution is much more 
damning. Pollution, however, could be a religious offense [18]. In summary, for her, taboos in 
“primitive” civilization, by virtue of their religious status and sanctions from the supernatural are 
inspired by fear [18]. The justifications may not be right for some group of persons but it surely worked 
in traditional African societies as far as environmental conservation is concerned. If humans are supreme 
as well as the measure of all things as the philosophy of madukakukism speculates, why will human be 
restricted from undertaking these dealing within the African environment? 
 
MADUKAKISM, AFRICAN ONTOLOGY AND PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOCENTRICISM 
Being in sub-Saharan African thought is hierarchically construed. This means that existence is seen 
in the form of a hierarchy. For instance, all being can be grasped to be at the highest level of existence 
through the Supreme Being (God) which is a purely non-physical form of existence, followed by 
ancestors, man, and lower animals. To this, Tempels avers, “it is because all being is a force and exists 
only in that it is a force, that the category ‘force’ includes of necessity all ‘beings’: God, men (living 
and departed), animals, plants, minerals” [19]. Although Tempels does not explicitly show the 
significance of this understanding of force to environmentalism, the understanding of African ontology 
helps understand African environmental ethics and as well as the inherent problem of 
anthropocentricism. 
However, since God is at the apex of all reality, He is in essence not disconnected from the rest of 
other physical beings. To this, Wiredu avers that the Supreme Being in African ontology “occupies the 
apex of the same hierarchy of being which accommodates, in its lower reaches, animals, plants and 
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inanimate objects” [20]. This, therefore, makes the physical form of existence and the non-physical form 
of existence in African philosophy to be a kind of unity, which ought to uphold harmonious relationships 
for the well-being of the environment. In this way, the teleological function of God is made possible by 
virtue of God being responsible for regulating the functions of the other forces which also are purposive 
in course. In this sense “God is supreme” and not man”. Imafidon also supports this teleological 
understanding of the Supreme Being in African philosophy. For him, “the Supreme Being who created 
and sustains the universe is seen as the epitome of force. He dispenses this energy of ontological unity 
at will to other entities. He is therefore at the apex of the hierarchy of being” [21].  
The ancestors are at the next level of existence, one that is above “human”, but also occupies the 
lower level from God, because of the level of their influence and participation towards human well-
being and their purpose in life. The reason why ancestors occupy a lower hierarchy than that of God is 
that they are not as powerful and influential as God, though they are more powerful and higher forces 
compared to the human. To this end, Mawere argues that “the intensity of participation differs resulting 
in some beings, being found at the top of the hierarchy and others at the bottom of the hierarchy” [22]. 
However, ancestors are vital forces which act as mediators between God and the living human 
community. They are also thought to be messengers of God to humanity [15]. In African ontology, since 
the Supreme Being is the most powerful and revered, it is not possible for the living to worship God by 
directly communicating with Him, just like the Abrahamic religion. Individuals communicate with the 
ancestors who are the medium of communication between the living and God. Ancestors are thought to 
be mediators between the physical world and the non-physical world of God. Ancestors are also the 
owners of land in any traditional community in Africa whose stead the local chief stands. However, land 
is believed to be sacred because it bears the remains of the ancestors particularly in the form of graves. 
A non-native of a community can only acquire land if, and only if, he or she is socially and politically 
acceptable in the community. The land asset is not to be abused and also not for sale; this is the major 
reason why it is only awarded to persons who belong to the community, and understands the significance 
and sacred nature of the resource. The fear of God and ancestors dealing ruthlessly with anyone who 
tried to cheat or anyone who tries to abuse it largely looms in the society. On the death of whosoever 
uses the land, it will be reverted back to the community. At times, his or her immediate dependants may 
be allowed to continue to use the land but again, they must continue to demonstrate respect and loyalty 
to the land, community, ancestors, and God. This also reveals that ‘man is not supreme’ and not ‘the 
measure of all things’ within the African environment.  
The existence of the human is very important in African world view as it occupies the center of the 
ontology as well as ecosystem. However, the existence of human person in African communitarian 
thought is not entirely centered on the human person as a lone individual like the case with the Cartesian 
conception of the individual, but it spreads to other forms of reality, and also in relation to other beings 
and forces. With reference to this metaphysical conception of the individual in African philosophy, 
Gyekye argues that even though a person lives in a human society, is not a self-sufficient atomic 
individual who does not depend on his or her relationships with others for the realization of his or her 
ends [23]. In this way, Gyekye’s view confirms the thinking that is inherent in African philosophy, 
which is centered on the notion that communal relations and communitarian existence are cardinal 
virtues in the understanding of the human person as well as ontology. Also, Murove avers that human 
well-being is inseparably anchored on the way human beings relates with all other existing beings within 
the environment [24].To this, one could argue that man being at unity with nature in African communal 
worldview does not necessarily mean that man is supreme above other beings within the environment. 
Notwithstanding, the differing degrees of purpose from one being to the other is determined by 
African ontological hierarchy of existence, which accounts for inherent value. Izibili explains that, 
inherent value is “. . . a matter of degree rather than an all or nothing affair such that those beings that 
have inherent value might comprise a hierarchy of those with the most inherent value being at the top 
and those with less occupying the bottom” [25]. This is possibly one reason why African environmental 
ethics is sometimes adjudged as being anthropocentric.  
This also flows from the accusation that man occupies a central position in the ecosystem as well 
as African ontology. Thus, often seems valid as it shows some level of weak anthropocentricism within 
the African communitarian social relations as well as environmental ethics. However, this kind of 
anthropocentricism poses no problem to the environment as it accommodates other members of the 
environment, and not subscribing to the ‘supremacy’ and dominating tendencies of strong 
Int. J. of Environmental Pollution &Environmental Modelling, Vol. 2(3) 129-136 (2019) 
 
134 
 
anthropocentrism. In an explanation to this, Mbiti explains that man being at the center of the ontology, 
does not imply that man lords over the environment but rather he should take care of the natural 
environment and also seek coexistence with nature. Mbiti claims that humans are not masters over nature 
to exploit it without feeling or treat it without respect [26]. Instead, people are one with nature, 
responsible toward nature, able to communicate with nature, and the chief priests of nature. This position 
is also echoed by Ekwealo who argues that Africans do not believe that humans are a special image of 
God who was placed to lord over nature. Rather, Africans believe in the unity of forces, and a human 
being’s special position is rather more of a caretaker of the universe, a task which goes with appropriate 
responsibility and consequences [27]. 
Lastly, in the order of ontology, there is a lower force that exists after “humanity”. This includes 
the non-human animals and other various forms of existence in the physical world. To this, Tempels 
avers that “after the category of human forces come the other forces, animals, vegetable and mineral”. 
These forces are measured as lower because of the level of their influence and participation towards 
other forces. In essence, these lower forces have lower vital force as opposed to the other forces within 
the African ontological hierarchy of existence. Despite having less vital force, their well-being is 
important in as far as they are metaphysically linked to their ontological counterparts such as human 
beings, ancestors and God. Although they are referred to as the lower forces, these animals, plants and 
other inanimate forms of reality are very powerful beings in the African ontological order. In African 
ontology, there is a vitalist and spiritual relationship that is shared between these lower forces and the 
other higher forces such as God and the ancestors. Existence of these lower forces is teleologically 
oriented because these lower forces are supposed to influence and contribute towards the well-being of 
human beings and other beings within the hierarchy of existence. They do so in the way in which they 
spiritually link human beings with God and their ancestors. For example, it is common in African 
ontology that certain plants and animal species are revered for certain religious purposes like symbols, 
rituals, and sacrifices. To this end, Mawere contends that “plants and animals can be habited by powerful 
forces which make them become very prominent in the spiritual rating of the society. This conception 
of being from the point of view of force is pervasive in African conception of being” [40]. This makes 
an African treat this non-human content with the utmost respect because of their spiritual link with both 
ancestors and God. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the above discussion, the problem of anthropocentricism is evident in African environmental 
ethics. Many authors have taken this to imply strong anthropocentricism, whereas it only accounts to 
weak anthropocentricism. It is weak anthropocentricism because the environment, takes precedence 
over ‘individual’. To this, Enyimba Madukakism’s which presents human beings as “supreme” in 
African culture calls for serious questioning as it undermines the importance of African communal 
nature. It is true that “human’ has a central place in both African ontology and ecosystem, this special 
position does not mean humans are ‘lord’ or rather “supreme” in the environment, but occupies a center 
space within ontology and ecosystem. This center position within the ecosystem has been branded chief 
priest of nature by Mbiti, likewise Ekwealo seeing this central position as caretaker of nature, rather 
than acclaimed “lord” or supreme. 
A caretaker could also be a tenant in a house, pays rent, relates to all other tenant mutually and also 
fulfills other obligations. This is a mere version of weak anthropocentrism. A caretaker could be said to 
be an important personality as long as the house is concerned, but going to the extent of branding him 
‘supreme’ is an overstatement [10]. Likewise, human just like any other species has an important place 
within the eco-system, but this does not amount to being supreme. Rather than being anthropocentric, 
this paper calls African environmental ethics Anthropoholism, this is basically because man lives in a 
complementary state and cannot exist without the environment in African culture.  Antropo – means 
“man or human” while holism means - the theory which states that parts of a whole are in friendly 
interconnection, such that they cannot exist separately from the whole, or cannot be understood without 
allusion to the whole [28].  
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